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I. Introduction 
Everyone seems concerned about government surveillance, yet 
we have a hard time agreeing when and why it is a problem and 
what we should do about it. When is surveillance in public 
unjustified? Does metadata raise privacy concerns? Should 
encrypted devices have a backdoor for law enforcement officials? 
Despite increased attention, surveillance jurisprudence and theory 
still struggle for coherence.1 Different kinds of surveillance are 
often not grouped together as part of the same problem, like facial 
recognition technologies and portals for viewing ISP records. 
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 1. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (collecting cases). 
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Proposed remedies also vary according to who is the watcher, the 
thing being surveilled, and the regulatory system in place to 
monitor the surveillance. In short, a common thread for modern 
surveillance problems has been difficult to find. 
At the heart of the surveillance debate are contested uses of 
technology that continuously and indiscriminately collect, use, and 
analyze information that people choose to share with others, such 
as automatic license plate readers that track all vehicles, software 
that scrapes and analyzes the social web, and drones that can 
effortlessly track multiple targets in public for long durations.2 In 
these cases, questions arise as to whether privacy violations occur 
when technology makes formerly manpower-intensive legitimized 
surveillance cheap and easy—ostensibly too easy. 
Yet, despite the widespread concern and extensive academic 
treatment of surveillance issues, the language and framing used in 
surveillance debate is diverse, inconsistent, and over-generalized.3 
When people try to identify what it means to live in a surveillance 
society, they usually say something like: “There is more data than 
ever before and it is increasingly easier for the government to 
access this data and understand what it means.” 
Theorists have responded in numerous ways, giving 
surveillance extensive academic attention. The literature links 
surveillance to issues of autonomy, trust, power, dignity, respect, 
identity, anonymity, disparate impact, and exploitation, among 
others.4 Scholars have proposed theories based on property, 
intellectual privacy, quantitative privacy, and others to help 
understand why and how surveillance is dangerous.5 Reform 
efforts have focused on pragmatism, bright-line time restrictions, 
curtilage, trespass, and a host of other strategies.6 
In particular, concepts like the “plain view” and “third party” 
doctrines, which enable surveillance of things and activities 
                                                                                                     
 2. See infra notes 9–11 (listing modern surveillance technologies). 
 3. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (collecting cases and 
discussing variance in judicial opinions regarding surveillance). 
 4. See infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text (summarizing academic 
discussion on surveillance). 
 5. See infra notes 138–141 (discussing the impact of surveillance on 
intellectual property). 
 6. See infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text (summarizing academic 
discussion on surveillance). 
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exposed or shared with others, conflict with modern notions of 
privacy. Most people bristle at the idea that there is absolutely “no 
privacy in public.” Critics have assailed the notion of 
indiscriminate public surveillance. Yet, other than the still-
developing “mosaic theory,” which recognizes the revelatory power 
of aggregated surveillance, little headway has been made 
regarding reform for many modern forms of government 
surveillance.7 
Ideas about preventing the surveillance society from going too 
far usually focus on three desirable outcomes: (1) prevent certain 
groups from ever having access to certain types of information; 
(2) prevent certain groups from being able to use certain types of 
information in select contexts or in certain ways; and (3) make it 
harder for certain groups to be able to access or interpret 
information. 
Government surveillance debates primarily revolve around 
the third strategy—making government surveillance hard but 
possible. Government surveillance concerns are rarely about 
prohibiting the government from ever being able to access any 
particular information, save issues like professional confidences, 
evidentiary privileges, and rights to resist self-incrimination. Nor 
are government surveillance concerns primarily about preventing 
the government from discriminating against us on the basis of 
information it should not be allowed to use, unless there is debate 
about what data should be considered fair game for consideration 
when creating things like the no-fly list. 
Instead, the main source of anxiety about government 
surveillance is about how easy it is for the government to access 
our information: how readily government agents can access our 
phones, our e-mail, our information stored in the cloud, our meta-
data, our geo-location data, and the like. Big concerns also exist 
about how easily the government can combine readily accessible 
data to form revealing profiles. 
We think the government’s relative difficulty in finding 
information is central to advancing the debate over government 
surveillance. In this Article we argue that the concept of 
“obscurity,” which deals with the transaction costs involved in 
                                                                                                     
 7. See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (explaining the mosaic 
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finding or understanding information, is the key to understanding 
and uniting modern debates about government surveillance.8 
Obscurity can do several things for privacy theorists and policy-
makers in the debate over government surveillance.  
First, obscurity can explain why making surveillance hard but 
possible is the central issue in the government surveillance 
debates. Second, obscurity can be used to help identify different 
areas where transactions costs for surveillance are operative and 
explain why they are central components of the debate. Third, 
obscurity can explain why the solutions to the government 
surveillance problem revolve around a common dynamic: 
introducing more transaction costs through friction and 
inefficiency into process, whether it be legally through procedural 
requirements like warrants or technologies like robust encryption. 
Ultimately, obscurity can provide a clearer picture of why and 
when government surveillance is troubling. Appeals to obscurity 
can also cultivate an appreciation for why and how transaction 
costs might be introduced into domains that have until now been 
regulated by policies like the third-party doctrine. 
Although these might seem like overly ambitious outcomes for 
applying a novel and fundamentally descriptive concept, the way 
we frame problems can affect how they are structured and 
resolved. Obscurity is a desirable locus for reform efforts because 
the concept translates well across different prescriptive 
surveillance theories. In part, this is because normative 
dimensions of surveillance theory have advanced more quickly 
than the vocabulary that is needed to identify when surveillance 
practices endanger values that the normative theories justify as 
being important to protect. 
A benefit of obscurity discourse having widespread theoretical 
applicability is that it can further diverse reform goals. By 
agreeing on a common descriptive theory of surveillance, reform 
advocates have a common thread for reform efforts. Academics can 
use obscurity to support normative surveillance theories. For 
example, obscurity can enhance the quality of arguments for rights 
of “intellectual privacy” and “quantitative privacy.” 
                                                                                                     
 8. See infra Part III (defining and discussing obscurity in the context of 
surveillance). 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, we describe the 
failure of the law to form a consistent, holistic response to 
surveillance. We demonstrate that while justices, advocates, 
policy-makers, and citizens intuitively understand surveillance 
problems, they often struggle to articulate how or why such 
surveillance is problematic. This inability to clearly describe the 
problem and find coherence among the diverse theories of 
surveillance has hindered consensus for reform.  
In Part III, we introduce the concept of obscurity and explain 
the important role that transaction costs for finding and 
understanding information have played in shaping our societal 
notions about privacy. We demonstrate that while the logic of 
obscurity preservation has been articulated in a number of judicial 
opinions regarding government surveillance, progress requires a 
more explicit adoption of the framing. In Part IV, we argue that 
obscurity should be the center of gravity for modern surveillance 
theory. As a descriptive concept, obscurity can explain when and 
how government surveillance is problematic. It provides a common 
thread for disparate surveillance theories. Finally, obscurity can 
be used to direct surveillance reform.  
II. Surveillance and Theory: Many Concerns, Little Consensus, No 
Locus 
Every week there is seemingly a new story concerning a 
troubling new surveillance practice or technology. Beyond the 
Snowden disclosures, the past few years have seen widespread use 
of cellphone-tower-mimicking technologies like the Stingray that 
allows police to intercept phone conversations,9 expansion of the 
FBI’s next generation facial-recognition technology system,10 
                                                                                                     
 9. See John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA 
TODAY (June 13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08 
/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-police/3902809 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“Armed 
with new technologies, including mobile devices that tap into cellphone data in 
real time, dozens of local and state police agencies are capturing information 
about thousands of cellphone users at a time, whether they are targets of an 
investigation or not . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See Rishi Iyengar, New FBI Software Can Process up to 52 Million Facial 
Images, TIME (Sept. 17, 2014), http://time.com/3389559/fbi-facial-recognition-
software-interstate-photo-system-ips-next-generation-identification-ngi (last 
visited June 12, 2015) (“A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the 
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license plate readers that allow both police and private parties to 
keep tabs on vehicles’ whereabouts,11 and drones are enabling 
more persistent and elusive public and private sector 
surveillance.12 These stories raise a general anxiety over a 
surveillance nation, yet they are different enough not to be grouped 
together both in terms of why they are problematic, as well as what 
to do about them. 
Facial-recognition technologies are often seen as problematic 
because it is impractical to hide your face when in public or change 
it as a surveillance countermeasure. Biometrics create a new class 
of “searchable” information. License plate readers, which simply 
record the location of a vehicle on a public road, create a different 
problem. Discussions surrounding license plate readers almost 
exclusively focus on the aggregated nature of such information. 
While observation of a single car’s license plate is seen as freely 
permissible, effortlessly recording hundreds of thousands of such 
observations and discerning patterns over time create a separate 
problem. 
                                                                                                     
foundation in April revealed that the system could process up to 52 million facial 
images, including millions of pictures taken for noncriminal purposes.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779 
(last visited June 12, 2015) (“The Justice Department has been building a 
national database to track in real time the movement of vehicles around the U.S., 
a secret domestic intelligence-gathering program that scans and stores hundreds 
of millions of records about motorists, according to current and former officials 
and government documents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See Tom Loftus, Concerns Rise About Growing Use of Domestic Drones, 
USA TODAY (July 18, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
2013/07/18/drone-concerns-rules-regulations/2552999 (last visited June 12, 2015) 
(“[G]overnment agencies and universities can apply to the FAA for a certificate of 
authority to fly a drone—large or small. Commercial drone usage is prohibited 
now but is expected to take off after September 2015, a deadline Congress gave 
the FAA to create a plan to integrate unmanned aircraft into the airspace.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Dan Roberts, FBI Admits 
to Using Surveillance Drones over US Soil, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/fbi-drones-domestic-surveillance 
(last visited June 12, 2015) (“However, the potential for growing drone use either 
in the US, or involving US citizens abroad, is an increasingly charged issue in 
Congress, and the FBI acknowledged there may need to be legal restrictions 
placed on their use to protect privacy.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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Still different is drone surveillance, which is often categorized 
as a “peeping tom” problem.13 Drones provide access to information 
that would have been unable or unlikely to be viewed by the naked 
eye before. Yet concerns about peeping drones are still different 
than debates surrounding cleavage, upskirt, and “creeper” photos 
in public. Here, the concern is not aggregation or newly enabled 
access to private spaces, but rather the fixation of a moment 
otherwise destined to be fleeting and forgotten. Unlike license 
plate readers, even one such instance can be problematic, even 
though people exposed themselves to the public. Yet, unlike 
peeping drones, cleavage and upskirt photos are often taken in 
public spaces.  
Thus, modern surveillance can be problematic because it 
involves secrets, fleeting public exposure, aggregated information, 
and unchangeable biological identifiers. This is to say nothing of 
the traditionally problematic surveillance issues involving the 
interception or requisition of communications and stored 
information.  
It is thus no surprise that it has been difficult to find a common 
center of gravity for surveillance policy and discourse. Focusing on 
aggregated information excludes consideration of single-instance 
surveillance. Focusing on the interception of communications can 
overshadow concerns about biometrics and genetic data. The lack 
of commonality among the many different issues has resulted in 
inconsistent and confusing policy, as well as discrete and diverse 
reform attempts. 
For example, the law of public surveillance is increasingly a 
mess. Courts and policy-makers regularly affirm that there is no 
“privacy in public.”14 Entire concepts like the “public view” doctrine 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Mary-Ann Russon, Are Flying Drones a Peeping Tom’s Dream Tool?, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/are-flying-drones-
peeping-toms-dream-tool-1452278 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“Fears are 
growing that helicopter drones could be used to sexually harass women and take 
secret photographs of them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See, e.g., Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 763 (W.D. Va. 2014) 
(discussing a public school teacher’s expectation of privacy in an office he shared 
with another teacher); Order to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements at 3, 
United States v. Cleveland, No. 18 DVM 1341 (Sup. Ct. D.C. Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/Cleveland%20motion%20to%20sup  
press%20order.pdf (“This court finds that no individual clothed and positioned in 
such a manner in a public area in broad daylight in the presence of countless 
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and “third party” doctrine enable this truth in surveillance law.15 
The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is the critical 
and central concept that determines the scope of a number of 
different critical privacy protections.16 It governs the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protections, as well as the torts of intrusion 
upon seclusion and the public disclosure of private facts, Fourth 
Amendment,17 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA).18 Courts and lawmakers have consistently established 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public 
information.19  
In the landmark case Katz v. United States,20 Justice Stewart 
wrote that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”21 Yet the Justice then went on to muddy the 
                                                                                                     
other individuals could have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 15. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 563 (2009) (“[A] person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information disclosed to a third party.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 317 (2012) (“[C]onduct 
does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy when it consists of observing 
the outside of property, observing what has already been exposed to the public, or 
observing public spaces where anyone may travel.”).  
 16.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the role of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fourth amendment context); see also 
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1512 
(2010) (“U.S. Supreme Court decisions applying the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test have been attacked as ‘unstable’ and ‘illogical,’ and even as 
engendering ‘pandemonium.’”).  
 17. See e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (“[T]he 
‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from 
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party . . . , even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).  
 18.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2012). 
 19. See McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437–38 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) 
(“Invasion of privacy consists of the public disclosure of private facts about the 
plaintiff . . . . The defendant must intentionally reveal facts which are of no 
legitimate public interest, as there is no right of privacy in public matters.” 
(emphasis added)); State v. Frost, 634 N.E.2d 272, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“The 
young ladies had no right of privacy at a public beach, and they probably expected 
to be observed in their bikini bathing suits.”). 
 20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)).  
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conceptual waters by stating in the next sentence: “But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”22 Katz extended the 
pronounced trend of courts to bluntly exclaim that there can be no 
privacy in publicly shared information, yet completely failed to 
conceptualize public information. Commenting on the trend 
exacerbated by Katz, Brian Serr wrote: 
[T]he Court has made little effort to refine [the reasonable 
expectation of privacy] test; instead, the Court has focused 
primarily on the ‘knowingly exposes to the public’ language that 
the Katz majority used. Regrettably, the Court has severed that 
language from its context and used it as a talisman, ruling that 
any objects, statements, or activities exposed to the public—
even if exposed only to a very limited degree—do not deserve 
fourth amendment protection.23 
In California v. Ciraolo,24 the Supreme Court wrote: 
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been 
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes 
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the 
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict 
some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations 
from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and 
which renders the activities clearly visible.25 
The Court noted that because aircraft could reasonably be 
expected to fly over one’s house at any time, “it is unreasonable for 
respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were 
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye 
from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”26 The Court observed that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in 
the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to 
observe what is visible to the naked eye.”27 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 597–98 (1989). 
 24. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 25. Id. at 213. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 215. 
1352 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2015) 
In United States v. Knotts,28 the Supreme Court similarly held 
that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”29 The Court reasoned that 
walking down the street voluntarily conveys to “anyone who 
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads 
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and 
the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads 
onto private property.”30 
But this line of reasoning is problematic. Consider the 
confusion the “no privacy in public” assertion causes within the 
tort of public disclosure of private facts.31 Courts often look to the 
location of where information is disclosed, yet there is no set 
definition for the term “public.”32 Public roads are obviously public, 
but what about indoor shopping malls? Offices in buildings? When 
are structures with four walls and a roof “public?” 
Academic and societal criticism has also failed to converge 
around a common discourse or set of principles for critique and 
reform. While such different theories and approaches are useful, 
the lack of common ground means that possibly related topics are 
spoken of in different ways and treated differently in law and 
policy.  
For example, scholars and the general public have revolted at 
the idea that there is no privacy in public and that the law should 
support such a notion.33 But the logic of such criticism and 
proposed reform is diverse. For example, Andrew Guthrie 
                                                                                                     
 28. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 29. Id. at 281–82. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 347 (1983) (citing 
numerous court decisions stating “that information individuals reveal about 
themselves in public places is by definition not private”). 
 32. See id. (demonstrating the difficulty of distinguishing public places from 
private places).  
 33. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First 
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
125, 169 (2002) (“Privacy, when defined as the boundary-maintenance necessary 
to individual and group definition, recognizes . . . that the ‘private’ can happen in 
‘public.’ We do not shed all privacy expectations simply because we walk on a 
public street, or enter a classroom, or attend a ball game.”).  
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Ferguson has proposed looking to the curtilage concept to resolve 
problematic questions of public surveillance.34 According to 
Ferguson, “the theory of personal curtilage turns on persons being 
able to control the constitutionally protected areas of their lives in 
public by signifying that they intend for an area to be secure from 
physical and sense-enhancing invasion.”35 This account of 
surveillance focuses on concepts like property and control.36 
For Helen Nissenbaum, public surveillance is all about 
context. Nissenbaum has theorized that privacy violations occur 
when “context-relative informational norms” are not respected 
when sharing information.37 In proposing a theory of privacy as 
contextual integrity, Nissenbaum has proposed that “when 
violations of norms are widespread and systematic as in public 
surveillance, when strong incentives of self-interest are behind 
these violations, when the parties involved are of radically unequal 
power and wealth, then the violations take on political significance 
and call for political response.”38 
In addressing the notion of privacy in public, Joel Reidenbuerg 
has proposed: 
[T]he transformation of information flows through three stages 
of development, which fundamentally undermines the concept 
of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ Information that was 
once private through obscurity now becomes technologically 
accessible. Information that was once merely accessible now 
becomes transparent and receives wide publicity. These 
                                                                                                     
 34. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth 
Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2014) (“This 
Article applies the theory of Fourth Amendment curtilage to persons acting in 
public.”). According to Ferguson, “[c]urtilage has long been understood as a legal 
fiction that expands the protection of the home beyond the formal structures of 
the house. Curtilage recognizes a buffer zone beyond the four walls of the home 
that deserves protection even in areas observable to the public.” Id. 
 35. Id. at 1287–88. 
 36. See id. (“Based on custom and law protecting against both nosy neighbors 
and the government, courts defined curtilage by the actions the property owner 
took to signal a protected space.”).  
 37. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010) (stating that the 
framework of contextual integrity provides that “finely calibrated systems of 
social norms, or rules, govern the flow of personal information in distinct social 
contexts (e.g., education, health care, and politics)”).  
 38. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 
119, 156 (2004). 
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parameter changes no longer fit within traditional court 
jurisprudence on privacy.”39  
According to Reidenberg, “constitutional democracy depends 
on spheres of privacy in public to preserve public safety and fair 
governance.”40 To create those spheres of privacy in public, 
Reidenberg proposed that “privacy protection be framed in terms 
of ‘governance-related’ and ‘nongovernance-related’ acts.”41 Thus, 
Reidenberg’s account of surveillance is dependent upon the nature 
of the acts being surveilled.  
Chris Slobogin has framed the issue of privacy in public as one 
of anonymity.42 In a different article, Slobogin proposes a solution 
to the problem of aggregated pieces of surveillance based upon the 
proportionality principle, “the idea that the justification for a 
search should be roughly proportional to the intrusiveness of the 
search” and “John Hart Ely’s political process theory.”43 According 
to Slobogin, “as applied to searches, this theory counsels that 
courts should generally defer to legislation authorizing searches of 
groups when the affected groups have meaningful access to the 
legislative process and the search is implemented in an even-
handed fashion.”44  
                                                                                                     
 39. Joel R. Reidenburg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 143 
(2014). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002) (“The Fourth 
Amendment should be construed to recognize the right to public anonymity as a 
part of the privacy expectations that, to use the Supreme Court’s well-known 
phrase, ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”). 
 43. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a 
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2012). 
 44. Id. Slobogin proposes specific language for the codification as follows: 
(a) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 48 hours in 
aggregate requires probable cause, and a warrant unless exigent 
circumstances exist. 
(b) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 20 minutes in 
aggregate but no longer than 48 hours in aggregate requires 
reasonable suspicion, and a court order unless exigent circumstances 
exist. 
(c) A targeted public search that does not last longer than 20 minutes 
in aggregate may occur at a law enforcement officer’s discretion 
whenever the officer believes in good faith that the search can 
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Jeffrey Skopek also couches the surveillance debate and 
proposed resolutions in terms of anonymity. Skopek argued that 
the failure of the law to protect privacy in public is the result of 
confusion between anonymity and privacy.45 These scholars are 
just a few of the many voices in surveillance law, policy, and theory 
with diverse views on when and why surveillance is a problem and 
what we should do about it.  
But this diversity makes it hard for courts and lawmakers to 
create coherent surveillance jurisprudence. Often, they must 
adhere to one account or another. A common ground for the modern 
surveillance debate would be useful. But first we must talk about 
“privacy” in a different way. Instead of focusing on traditional 
notions of “private” and “public,” we propose that the concept of 
obscurity, which deals with the difficulty and probability of 
discovering or understanding information, is more effective than 
traditional frames for the surveillance debate. Obscurity sits along 
a continuum. Appeals to the concept can mitigate the atomistic 
nature of modern surveillance policy and discourse and can help 
resolve our tendency to fall back into the public privacy divide.  
III. An Obscurity Primer 
In this Part, we develop our theory of surveillance as loss of 
obscurity. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word 
“obscurity” has been in circulation for quite some time.46 Its 
original meaning, the “quality or condition of not being clearly 
known or understood,” dates back to 1474, and by 1495 it also 
                                                                                                     
accomplish a legitimate law enforcement objective. 
Id. at 24. 
 45. See Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2523393&download=yes (“The problem with the public exposure  and  
third  party doctrines is not only that they fail to recognize that a piece of personal 
information can be protected in varying degrees . . . . In addition, and more 
fundamentally, they conflate two distinct forms that this protection can take: 
privacy  and  anonymity.”).  
 46. See OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004) (defining “obscurity”), 
available at www.oed.com/view/Entry/129848?redirectedFrom=obscurity#eid34 
119781. 
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meant “a wholly or partially unintelligible expression.”47 In the 
early part of the 16th century, when Gavin Douglas famously 
translated Virgil’s The Aeneid, obscurity became associated with 
“uncertainty of meaning.”48 And while members of our 
contemporary fame-obsessed society use obscurity to refer to “the 
quality or condition of being unknown” and an “unknown person” 
or “unknown thing,” their etymologies respectively begin in 1578 
and 1822.49 
The law, however, has its own specialized lexicon for obscurity. 
The canonical starting point for explicit debate about “practical 
obscurity” in the American judicial system is the 1989 ruling of 
U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press.50 There the Supreme Court recognized a privacy interest 
in information that is publicly available, but nevertheless difficult 
to obtain.51  
Specifically, the Court determined that the Freedom of 
Information Act requirements do not compel the federal 
government to use its criminal records database to expedite access 
to rap sheets so that inquirers are spared effort and expense; 
justice is not violated if they have to seek out the information from 
inconveniently located places, such as courthouses’ files.52 In 
delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens writes: 
In sum, the fact that ‘an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not 
mean that an individual has no interests in limiting disclosure 
or dissemination of the information’ . . . the substantial 
character of that interest is affected by the fact that in today's 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). In the domain of cybersecurity, obscurity has a 
technical meaning as well. There it involves “hiding information”: concealing 
vulnerabilities, so that others cannot take advantage of those weaknesses, and 
“deliberately suppressing general information about a system to make things 
more difficult for adversaries, hackers, and third parties to discover flaws in a 
system.” EDWARD AMOROSO, CYBER ATTACKS: PROTECTING NATIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 171 (2012).  
 51. See United States v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 750 (1989) 
(recognizing a strong privacy interest in maintaining the “practical obscurity” of 
a rap sheet). 
 52. See id. (“[T]he privacy interest in maintaining the rap sheet's ‘practical 
obscurity’ is always at its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure 
is at its nadir.”). 
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society the computer can accumulate and store information that 
would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person 
attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.53 
Unfortunately, Reporters Committee turned out to be, thus far, the 
legal apex for obscurity argumentation.54 In subsequent years, 
there has been only intermittent case law acknowledgement that 
the logic underlying the decision is valid and has broader 
applicability.55  
For example, although the term “obscurity” is not used in the 
Supreme Court of New York case Bursac v. Suozzi,56 the ruling 
does cite privacy interests acknowledged in Reporters Committee.57 
In this instance, the court determined that while DWI arrests are 
a matter of public record, Nassau County Executive Thomas 
Suozzi went too far in creating an online “Wall of Shame,” 
containing mugshots and names of people who were arrested in his 
country for the offense.58 
According to Judge William R. LaMarca: 
It is the scope and permanency of public disclosure on the 
Internet by a governmental agency that distinguishes the 
County’s “Wall of Shame” from traditional and regular forms of 
reporting and publication such as print media. The County 
Executive's campaign of publicizing DWI arrests serves a 
legitimate purpose but the use of specific identifying 
information on the Internet, with its endless implications, is of 
concern to the court.59 
Simply put, because publishing DWI arrests online can lead to 
“limitless and eternal notoriety, without any controls,” the court 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 770. 
 54. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online 
Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2012) (discussing the reluctance of courts to 
expand upon the “practical obscurity” concept articulated in Reporters 
Committee).   
 55. See id. at 21–22 (“Beyond a general sense that shared or available 
information does not always constitute public information, courts have had a 
difficult time expanding on the concept.”). 
 56. 868 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 57. See id. at 479 (“The Internet has no sunset and postings on it will last 
and be available until some person purges the Web site, perhaps in decades to 
come.”). 
 58. Id. at 473–74. 
 59. Id. at 480.  
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concluded that the risk is too great that unfair harms will come to 
those listed on the digital wall.60 Beyond undermining the 
constitutionally protected due process that should be afforded to 
those profiled (by presenting potential members of a jury with 
incriminating portraits), the information too easily induces bias 
and can tempt potential employers and landlords to abuse their 
power in perpetuity.61 
With cases like these in mind, we have proposed our own 
definition of obscurity that is privacy-oriented: “Obscurity is the 
idea that when information is hard to obtain or understand, it is, 
to some degree, safe.”62 Obscurity considerations can play a role in 
protecting all forms of communication, and “online obscurity” 
exists when at least one of the four “key factors” is missing that 
play a crucial role in discovering or comprehending information: 
“(1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and 
(4) clarity.”63 Because there are many ways to manipulate these 
factors, different strategies can make online disclosures more 
obscure. For example:  
[S]haring ideas on platforms that are invisible to search 
engines; using privacy settings and other access controls; 
withholding your real name and speaking anonymously or 
identifying yourself with a pseudonym; disclosing information 
in coded ways that only a limited audience will grasp; or 
transmitting content that is encrypted or temporarily accessible 
through an ephemeral conduit, like Snapchat, the photo 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 481. 
 61. See id. at 480 (“It is the scope and permanence of public disclosure on the 
Internet by a government agency that distinguishes the County’s ‘Wall of Shame’ 
from traditional and regular forms of reporting and publication such as print 
media.”). 
 62. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think 
About Your Data Than “Privacy,” THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-
to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/ (last visited June 12, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow 
Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTELEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
TECHNOLOGY (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew eds., 2014), (“Obscurity is the idea that 
information is safe—at least to some degree—when it is hard to obtain or 
understand.”). 
 63. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 54, at 2. 
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messaging application that can delete information within 
seconds after the recipient views it.64 
While anyone can use these strategies and related ones, 
discrete individual action is not the only scale for adding obscurity 
to the online information ecology. Consider the recent policy debate 
over Europe’s so-called “right to be forgotten” and America’s so-
called “erasure” laws.65 We believe that some of the discussions 
have gotten derailed when partisans insist that the ability to 
delete links to information stored on Google or to remove 
information minors previously posted on websites is tantamount 
to historical revisionism—a prohibition that prevents others from 
noticing that someone once wrote something or had something 
written about him or her.  
To correct these exaggerated interpretations, we have argued 
the endeavors should be fundamentally construed as obscurity-
promoting initiatives that make it hard (or harder), but not 
impossible, to discover irrelevant, inadequate, and embarrassing 
details.66 After all, in the former case, original source material is 
                                                                                                     
 64. Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 62. 
 65. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, A Stronger Online Eraser Law Would Be a 
Mistake, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg 
22029420.200-a-stronger-online-eraser-law-would-be-a-mistake.html#.VQyHa47 
F_E8 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“So I firmly believe the goal of erasing 
unremarkable self-disclosures is more palatable than the broad ‘right to be 
forgotten’ proposals by the EU and France. California's effort is closer to a ‘right 
to hide.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric Posner, We All 
Have a Right To Be Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_r
ight_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html (last visited June 
12, 2015) (“It’s not a right to be purged from the memory of people who know you, 
but rather to control how information about you appears online.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to 
“Forget”, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014 
/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=2 (last visited June 12, 2015) 
(arguing the Europe’s “right to be forgotten” is both too broad in that it “allows 
individuals to impede access to facts about themselves found in public documents” 
and too narrow in that it “doesn’t require that unwanted information be removed 
from the web”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 66. See Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 62 (“Safety, here, doesn’t mean 
inaccessible. Competent and determined data hunters armed with the right tools 
can always find a way to get it. Less committed folks, however, experience great 
effort as a deterrent.”); Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 62 (“When information is 
hard to come by, the only people who will seize upon it are those with sufficient 
motivation to expend the necessary effort and resources.”). 
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left intact, while the latter instance does not obliterate third party 
re-posts.67 Although appeals to authority have questionable 
evidentiary weight, it is still worth noting that Federal Trade 
Commissioner Julie Brill has used similar framing.68  
At its core, our account of obscurity is predicated upon a causal 
view of human behavior: people are routinely deterred from 
pursuing goals that require expending effort or assets when they 
lack the requisite motivation or resources. The main causal claim 
at the heart of obscurity theory, therefore, is that when 
information is difficult to acquire or burdensome to interpret, the 
only people who will be inclined to do the detective work are those 
who deem the expense an acceptable cost.  
Because many factors can go into determining when a person 
judges the expense of obscurity-minimizing measures as 
reasonable to incur, calculations about who will be thwarted by 
obscurity-enhancing techniques are always probabilistic in nature. 
Creating restraints by adding transaction costs can never provide 
the peace of mind offered by absolute safeguards that guarantee 
competent and determined parties—including busybodies, 
enemies, aggrieved members of a community, hackers, and 
government agencies—are definitively unable to obtain or 
decipher disclosures we wish to selectively share. But then again, 
it is doubtful that such foolproof safeguards actually exist. As Paul 
Ohm rightly notes, “No technology is perfect, and advocates who 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Google Can’t Forget You, But It 
Should Make You Hard to Find, WIRED (May 20, 2014), http://www.wired. 
com/2014/05/google-cant-forget-you-but-it-should-make-you-hard-to-find/ (last 
visited June 13, 2015) (“This debate is not and should not be about forgetting or 
disappearing in the traditional sense. Instead, let’s recognize that the talk about 
forgetting and disappearing is really concern about the concept of obscurity in the 
protection of our personal information.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 68. See JULIE BRILL, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF OMNISCIENCE: APPROACHES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 2 (2014) (“Here, we can all agree that as the Age of 
Omniscience descends upon us, we can and will find ways to protect individual 
privacy.”); see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Why You Have the Right 
to Obscurity, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0415/Why-you-
have-the-right-to-obscurity (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (interviewing 
Commissioner Brill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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comment on privacy and technology in truth almost never advocate 
for perfect privacy . . . .”69 
Research across the disciplines, both old and new, supports 
our causal intuitions. Modern scholarship critiques the recent 
obsession over “frictionless sharing” via social media.70 But as far 
back as antiquity, people testified that expediency is a seductive 
temptation. Take Plato’s famous discussion of the story Gyges in 
The Republic (360 B.C.E.), a parable that is presented so we can 
consider why a mythical shepherd behaved badly by using a ring 
of invisibility to effortlessly kill a king and seduce his wife, the 
queen.71 Plato was not simply articulating why moral deliberation 
is required to reject egoism and the realist doctrine that justice is 
the advantage of the stronger. He also was identifying frictionless 
experience as a corruptive force.72  
Contemporary discussion about the ethics of using consumer 
technology often revolves around concern about diminished effort 
diminishing our experiences. For example, Albert Borgmann, a 
preeminent philosopher of technology, argues that the prevalence 
of cheap consumer devices designed to disburden us from hard 
work by providing safe, easy, and instantaneous opportunities for 
satisfaction significantly impedes our desire to develop the type of 
robust character needed to pursue a truly meaningful life: the 
availability of fast food and microwave dinners disinclines families 
from preparing meals from scratch; and the ease of being 
entertained by televisual media incentivizes us to avoid more 
taxing activities, like reading.73 In the same spirit, one of us has 
                                                                                                     
 69. Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2008).  
 70. See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 
713 (2013) (“There are just three problems with making frictionless sharing of 
reader records our default: Frictionless sharing isn’t frictionless, it isn’t really 
sharing, and it’s corrosive of intellectual privacy and intellectual freedom.”); 
William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 15–17 (2013) 
(“[T]he word ‘friction’ has another meaning: it describes the forces that impede 
individuals from disclosing personal information when they use online 
services. . . . [M]any implementations of frictionless architecture have gone too 
far, potentially invading privacy and drowning useful information in a tide of 
meaningless spam.”). 
 71.  See JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 110 (2014) (recounting 
the story of Gyges). 
 72. See id. at 109–10 (“Even when it is incredibly easy, expediency is not 
necessarily a virtue.”). 
 73. See generally ALBERT BORGMANN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHARACTER OF 
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argued that technological norms that demonize inefficient 
communication undermine the care and respect that etiquette is 
meant to inspire, and automated forms of communication that 
appreciably lessen thought and intentionality can diminish both 
autonomy and conscientiousness.74 
The ethical stakes of altering effort are not limited to the 
effects of using commodities. They also extend to a vast range of 
policy issues. For example, in their account of “nudging,” 
behavioral economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass 
Sunstein argue that because humans are prone to being influenced 
by the cognitive bias of inertia, it is incumbent upon designers to 
help us avoid doing self-sabotaging things by creating sticky 
defaults that capitalize on our laziness.75 
For example, providing small plates in cafeterias will make it 
easier for people to avoid overeating because many will not bother 
to wait in line for seconds. Retirement plans that automatically 
enroll employees will minimize the regret that people come to 
experience after realizing that being deterred by having to fill out 
an opt-in form and submitting it to human resources and resulting 
in them being financially unprepared to retire. Requiring driver’s 
license applicants to decide whether or not to be organ donors will 
                                                                                                     
CONTEMPORARY LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1984) (arguing that overreliance 
on technology leads to a life dominated by effortless and thoughtless 
consumption). 
 74. See Evan Selinger, We’re Turning Digital Natives into Etiquette 
Sociopaths, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/digital-
natives-etiquette-be-damned/ (last visited June 13, 2015) (“[W]hile living 
according to the gospel of technological efficiency and frictionless sharing is fine 
as a Silicon Valley innovation ethos, it makes for a downright depressing social 
ethic.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Evan Selinger, Will 
Autocomplete Make You Too Predictable?, BBC FUTURE (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150115-is-autocorrect-making-you-boring 
(last visited June 13, 2015) (“[B]y encouraging us not to think too deeply about 
our words, predictive technology may subtly change how we interact with one 
another. As communication becomes less of an intentional act, we give others 
more algorithm and less of ourselves.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 75. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (offering 
advice on preventing common mistakes based on research from fields of 
behavioral science and economics).  
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help them more readily actualize their altruistic intentions than if 
they faced opt-in schemes.76  
And in their attempt to move debates about warfare beyond 
the concerns typically expressed over international law and local 
political processes, philosopher John Kaag and political scientist 
Sarah Kreps insist that drone strikes can minimize so many 
expenses for the United States—not just economic costs, but also 
in terms of potentially saving many soldiers’ lives—that the 
country is at risk of embracing a moral hazard whereby the 
problem of “dirty hands” gets magnified, while citizens are 
shielded from its reality and consequences.77  
One of the most important things to keep in mind when seeing 
situations as calling for obscurity-enhancing strategies is that 
obscurity is not an all-or-nothing state of affairs. Rather, obscure 
statements exist on a nuanced continuum of disclosure wherein we 
enter into public and semi-public settings, but aim to limit our 
communication to select audiences. Because these are instances 
where we volunteer thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, pursuing 
obscurity clearly cannot be the same thing as aiming for total 
secrecy.  
And yet, at the same time, when obscurity considerations are 
in play we are not inviting everyone in the world to know our 
business, nor are we demonstrating allegiance to the ideal of a 
totally transparent life. Hence, one of us has argued that 
“[o]bscurity explains why we are comfortable talking about 
personal information in a crowded restaurant and posting personal 
information to a restricted number of people within online 
communities.”78 Indeed, “[a] significant portion of our everyday 
interaction places us into a zone of obscurity, where our identity 
                                                                                                     
 76. One of us has contested Thaler and Sunstein’s approach to organ 
donation. See generally Kyle Powys Whyte, Evan Selinger, Arthur L. Caplan & 
Jathan Sadowski, Nudge, Nudge or Shove, Shove—the Right Way for Nudges to 
Increase the Supply of Donated Cadaver Organs, 12:2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32 (2012) 
(arguing that Thaler and Sunstein’s approach fails to appreciate how perceptions 
of meaning can influence people’s responses to nudges).  
 77. See KAAG & KREPS, supra note 72, at 109–10 (“[B]ut the story also 
suggests that it is difficult to blame a person whom you can’t see, and even harder 
to bring them to justice. In these disturbing cases, a wicked act can go 
unexamined and therefore unpunished.”). 
 78. Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 
1038 (2013).  
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and personal context are unknown to those we interact with or 
share common space.”79 Socialization typically depends on some 
ability to manage the accessibility and comprehension of social 
exchanges by outsiders, the loss of which can be quite harmful.80  
Obscurity is not a contemporary phenomenon. Indeed, social 
norms have historically developed around it. Jim Harper correctly 
notes: 
Practical obscurity has long ensured that even nonprivate 
information is not widely shared. An endless array of social, 
legal, and economic practices has developed around the 
assumption that the information collected about people will 
remain practically obscure. The things we wear, the places we 
go, the people we see, the things we say, and the things we buy 
have all been chosen in the best under the umbrella of practical 
obscurity.81  
While Harper makes descriptive observations about what has been 
the case, Harry Surden has gone a step further and argued that 
the practical limitations that make obscurity possible—including 
the “latent structural constraints” of transaction costs—have 
historically created a psychological sense that citizens are 
protected by “structural rights.”82  
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. Consider how many unidentified people interact with each other in 
restaurants, office buildings, public transportation, and the like. 
 80. See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
(1975) (analyzing the concepts of privacy, crowding, territory, and personal space, 
with regard to human behavior); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (studying human behavior in social situations and the way 
we appear to others); ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS (1966) (discussing social psychology 
research in social settings); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: 
DIALECTICS OF DISCOURSE (2002) (offering a practical theory for why people make 
decisions about revealing and concealing private information); Erving Goffman, 
Felicity’s Condition, 89 AM. J. SOC. 1, 51 (1983) (reviewing work in 
sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and conversational analysis in the sociological study 
of social interaction); Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most Personal Secrets Get 
Outed on Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044416580457800874057820022 
4.html (last visited June 12, 2015) (describing the harmful effects of inadvertently 
disclosing information known only to a small group on the social network site 
Facebook) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 81. JIM HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS: HOW IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND 
MISUNDERSTOOD 162 (2006).  
 82. See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 
1607 (2007) (“In the privacy context, society implicitly relies upon non-legal 
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This special class of rights is a matter of legally codified, 
positive entitlements. Instead, structural rights are pervasive 
social expectations about how information can be accessed, 
interpreted, and shared. The crucial thing, Surden insists, is that 
when structural rights are sufficiently strong and reliably present, 
they can contribute to a climate where it seems unnecessary for 
society to take further legal steps to protect our interests.83 
Consequently, lawmakers need to avoid succumbing to the 
reductionist temptation of believing that all of the protections 
citizens expect to be in place have been formally assigned legal 
rights. 
Given the nuance and historical depth of obscurity, appeals to 
the concept can shed new light on a range of privacy debates that 
have been theoretically limited by seemingly intractable binary 
terms. In normative discourse, as well as privacy law and policy, 
there is a tendency to consider information as either public or 
private.84 “This maligned on/off approach to privacy has been 
called the ‘public-private dichotomy’ or ‘secrecy paradigm.’”85  
Daniel Solove describes the secrecy paradigm as an 
understanding of privacy based on concealment preventing others 
from invading one’s hidden world.86 Under this conception, 
disclosed information is no longer concealed and thus, no longer 
private. Sharon Sandeen notes that this “vision of privacy makes 
it difficult for individuals to protect personal information once it 
has been shared with others.”87 Solove argued that the secrecy 
                                                                                                     
regulators to prevent a large number of unwanted behaviors.”).  
 83. See id. at 1609 (“To the extent that society depends upon the presence of 
these costs to reliably inhibit a potential privacy-violating activity, their 
dissipation results in a sudden regulatory shift, leaving these interests 
unprotected.”). 
 84. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 54, at 17 (“[M]any conflicts seem to 
stem from one problem—individuals have complex notions of privacy in regard to 
personal information but the law tends to treat that information only two ways: 
public or private.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 42 (2004) (“Privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded 
by watching and by public disclosure of confidential information.”).  
 87. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn 
from Trade Secret Law, 6 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 694 (2006).  
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paradigm “fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things 
private from some people but not others.”88 
Disclosing information to some, but not all, is a difficult task. 
Solove asserts that not all private activities are pure secrets  
in the sense that they occur in isolation and in hidden corners. 
When we talk in a restaurant, we do not expect to be listened 
to. A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication in a 
store open to the public, but certainly expects these purchases 
to be private activities.89 
Solove holds that, contrary to the notion that information in 
public records cannot be private, “there is a considerable loss of 
privacy by plucking inaccessible facts buried in some obscure 
[public] document and broadcasting them to the world on the 
evening news.  Privacy can be infringed even if no secrets are 
revealed and even if nobody is watching us.”90 
It is worth asking whether complete secrecy is even possible 
in a networked world.  Solove posits that life in the information age 
“often involves exchanging information with third parties, such as 
phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies, 
merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as 
total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in 
today’s world.”91 
Other scholars have advocated similar obscurity-related 
pursuits. For example, Rebecca Green expressed concern that 
digital-age citizens who sign petitions and contribute to political 
causes by donating small amounts of money are at heightened risk 
of having undesired parties monitor their views.92 While those of 
us who are comfortable proclaiming our political beliefs to anyone 
who will listen will not be deterred by this possibility, others who 
prefer to be discrete may become less willing to participate in basic 
                                                                                                     
 88. SOLOVE, supra note 86, at 44. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1152 
(2002).  
 92. See Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. 
L. REV. 367, 367 (2013) (“But if political privacy does matter, if the reaction to 
amplified exposure in petition signing does dissuade people from signing 
petitions, a basic part of our political process will be threatened.”).  
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political processes—especially when troubling outcomes can arise 
if the wrong crowd gets wind of where our sympathies lie.93 
As Green points out, groups who are opposed to certain ideas 
or outcomes can target supporters for harassment.94 Among other 
things, politically motivated groups can circulate lists that reveal 
who signed petitions alongside other publically available 
information, such as the signatories’ addresses, phone numbers, 
and even links to online maps that give directions to their homes.95  
Ultimately, Green contends that if we reach undesirable levels 
of concern, society will need to acknowledge that a threat to 
“political privacy” has arisen from lost “political obscurity.” On a 
descriptive level, she defines the term as follows:  
Political obscurity refers to the state of one’s political 
preferences being shrouded or otherwise difficult to discern or 
distinguish by others. A person enjoys political obscurity when 
she can go about her day as she so chooses without others 
perceiving or otherwise determining the nature of her political 
views. The politically obscure person is able to control and 
manage the extent of disassociation from the political views she 
holds (or once held) or political actions taken in the present and 
in the past.96  
Prescriptively, then, if political obscurity were viewed as a right, it 
would be understood as “the fundamental right to exist without 
one’s political preferences being continuously recorded.”97 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is skepticism about the 
possibility of preventing the death of obscurity, as well as concern 
that proposals for protecting obscurity are misguided. Some insist 
that technological development makes appeals to obscurity 
antiquated. Anita Allen writes: 
The Reporter’s Committee case . . . is also significant today as a 
kind of swan song, maybe a dirge. Thanks to electronic records, 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. at 386 (“Growing empirical evidence suggests that waning 
political obscurity threatens petitioning.”). 
 94. See, e.g., id. (“The plaintiffs feared this targeted Internet dissemination 
would effectively become a blueprint for harassment and discrimination.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 95. See id. at 400 (describing the ability of political organizers to purchase 
targeted lists of likely petition signers). 
 96. Id. at 373. 
 97. Id. 
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the Internet and search engines, the vaunted “practical 
obscurity” of data is soon to be a memory. Data once resigned to 
the dustbin of history is now at anyone’s fingertips . . . . Bad 
behavior today, or unwise or inadvertent disclosures, are not 
forgotten; they will never become practically obscure.98  
Others acknowledge that the concept of “obscurity” adds 
nuance to the privacy lexicon but doubt its legal relevance. Brian 
Wassom claims, “It is difficult to envision how obscurity could be 
lawfully enforced in a legal framework that forbids government 
restrictions on speech.”99 
Others still explicitly reject appeals to obscurity to justify the 
law-restricting endeavors for collecting and reporting truthful 
disclosures “to prevent a perceived, potential harm to someone’s 
privacy interests.”100 In this context, it has been asserted that 
obscurity claims depart too strongly from established precedent, 
including the third-party doctrine, the logic underlying the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the privacy of the home in its 
discussions of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, and the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of privacy interests existing for things 
done in “plain view” or “open fields.”101 It has also been argued that 
obscurity claims suffer from the twin maladies of overstating 
harms and understating the value of transparency.102 
There also are issue-specific rejections of proposals that are 
grounded in obscurity ideals. For example, it has been argued that 
                                                                                                     
 98. ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 162 (2011). 
 99. BRIAN WASSOM, AUGMENTED REALITY LAW, PRIVACY, AND ETHICS: LAW, 
SOCIETY, AND EMERGING AR TECHNOLOGIES 46 (2014). 
 100. Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic 
Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 549 (2011); 
see also Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How 
Obscurity-Based Privacy and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free 
Speech, 18 COMM. L. & POL'Y 91, 119–20 (2013) (“The concept of a privacy interest 
arising out of the obscurity of information . . . [is] fundamentally at odds with the 
established theories that undergird the American First Amendment right of 
freedom of speech.”). 
 101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (presenting doctrinal 
arguments against calls for a right to obscurity). 
 102. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 550 (“[T]hese scholars’ demand for a 
right to obscurity is misplaced because they (i) overstate the potential harms 
linked to more technologically-advanced and democratized exposure, and (ii) 
inadequately account for the many benefits of exposure that would be blocked 
should their quest for a tight to obscurity succeed.”). 
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the Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in Los Angeles 
Police Department v. United Reporting Company.103 That case 
concerned a California statute that prevented people from 
receiving access to government records of arrestees if they were 
going to use the information for commercial purposes like selling 
products or services.104 The supposed problem with this decision is 
that the discrimination imposes “unwarranted” expense on the 
barred groups, risks creating a false sense of security that a 
privacy problem has been solved, and erroneously crafts policy 
based on the form information is stored in, rather than the “nature 
of the information” itself.105 
Yet despite such criticism, we propose that obscurity can be 
the key to unifying the diaspora of modern surveillance theory and 
policy because of its utility and broad applicability due to its 
fundamental reliance on transaction costs and probabilities. As we 
discuss below, it is easier to explain why certain surveillance is 
problematic when surveillance is understood as loss of obscurity. 
A focus on obscurity can accommodate multiple interests in 
reforming surveillance law, making consensus more likely. 
IV. Obscurity Should Be at the Center of the Government 
Surveillance Debate 
Diverse theories inform how the law regulates surveillance 
and how scholars determine which ideals and principles should 
guide surveillance law reform. Key components of leading theories 
can be rephrased into obscurity terms. We believe that talking 
about surveillance as a loss of obscurity can render both policy and 
contemporary conversation about surveillance less fragmented. By 
outlining a conceptual center of gravity that underlies and 
connects different surveillance theories, we aim to create a new 
                                                                                                     
 103. 528 U.S. 32 (1999); see also ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE 
DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 60 (2002) 
(“Imposing additional expense on particular businesses to acquire the same 
information that is available to other parties, like journalists or advocacy groups, 
seems unwarranted.”). 
 104. United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 34–36. 
 105. See RAUL, supra note 103, at 60 (“Moreover, differential denial of public 
access to public information may lull government agencies into believing they 
have solved a problem.”). 
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and useful vantage point for assessing how far surveillance creep 
extends and determining how best to address the expansion.106 In 
this Part, we will use Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Neil 
Richard’s theory of intellectual privacy as exemplars of how 
embracing obscurity can improve the state of surveillance law and 
theory, respectively. 
A. Obscurity and the Fourth Amendment 
Although the Fourth Amendment is the locus classicus of 
juridical approaches to surveillance, debate rages over 
unanswered questions and conflicting interpretations.107 
According to Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, there are structural 
reasons why discord has come to plague views about protections 
and permissions: tension exists between principles articulated 
before the digital age began and the new opportunities for 
surveillance that innovation has made possible; a patchwork 
approach to resolving cases has resulted in “doctrinal gaps,” rather 
than a unified paradigm of surveillance theory; the guiding 
analytic concepts, including “probable cause” and “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” are overdetermined and require inherently 
contestable judgment to operationalize;  and dispute exists over 
what basic value (or values) the Fourth Amendment is supposed to 
safeguard.108 
                                                                                                     
 106. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the link between surveillance theory and 
obscurity). 
 107. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment 
Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1305–06 (2014) (“Scholars have 
debated the textual meaning of its clauses
 
as well as the core purpose of the 
Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
 108. See id.  
[T]he method of surveillance should be irrelevant, and the results of 
the surveillance are all that should matter in determining whether an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed. 
Thus, in applying the Katz test, courts should look only to the 
characteristics of the item or information being observed—its location, 
its nature, and/or the actions taken by the defendant to conceal it. 
(citing Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo, A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth 
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321–
22 (2002)); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical 
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 
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732 (1993) (discussing the intrusiveness theory); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not 
Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1998) (claiming that the Terry principle needs to be 
rejuvenated because later case law is too vague); Christopher Slobogin, The World 
Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (providing an 
overview of how searches and seizures should be handled without the Fourth 
Amendment); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1511, 1511 (2010) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should provide protection whenever 
a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular form of 
government information gathering.”); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) 
When changing technology or social practice makes evidence 
substantially harder for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court 
generally adopts lower Fourth Amendment protections for these new 
circumstances to help restore the status quo ante level of government 
power. On the other hand, when changing technology or social practice 
makes evidence substantially easier for the government to obtain, the 
Supreme Court often embraces higher protections to help restore the 
prior level of privacy protection. 
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2002) 
Official exploitation of a scientific or technological device should be 
considered a Fourth Amendment search at least when the effect is to 
enhance, augment or supplement human sensory abilities or other 
capacities in ways that have made it possible for the authorities to gain 
access to any information that otherwise would have been, or is highly 
likely to have been, imperceptible or inaccessible or would only have 
been, or is highly likely only to have been, perceived or acquired by 
means that are governed by the Fourth Amendment. 
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002) 
Continuous, repeated or recorded government surveillance of our 
innocent public activities that are not meant for public consumption is 
neither expected nor to be condoned, for it ignores the fundamental fact 
that we express private thoughts through conduct as well as through 
words. The Fourth Amendment should be construed to recognize the 
right to public anonymity as a part of the privacy expectations that, to 
use the Supreme Court’s well-known phrase, “society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.” 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the 
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The 
Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy.”); Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a 
New Framework, Replacing the Right to Privacy, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 20 
(2007) 
For example, were “search” defined as a violation of intrinsic human 
dignity, it is likely the Court would recognize aerial surveillance into 
one's backyard, without warrant, as a violation of the home dweller’s 
dignity. Stop and frisk, based on less than probable cause, would 
similarly violate reasonable standards of dignity. And, for the motorist, 
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Perhaps the most important recent case to cause controversy 
over how to interpret the Fourth Amendment is United States v. 
Jones.109 There, the Justices unanimously ruled that police 
performed a constitutionally prohibited search when, one day after 
their warrant expired, they installed a GPS device to a car’s 
undercarriage that suspected narcotics dealer Antoine Jones drove 
with the intent of keeping tabs on his activity.110 For twenty-eight 
days, the government unrelentingly tracked and recorded where 
the vehicle went, amassing over 2,000 pages of location data.111 
The majority opinion focused on the act of physical intrusion 
that had transpired.112 But concurring opinions from Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito clarified why this narrow approach leaves 
deep problems on the horizon.113 Eighteenth-century trespass law 
rooted in property-rights theory might suffice to resolve the matter 
                                                                                                     
whose car might in fact be his or her most cherished place, arbitrary 
police intrusion might preclude much that happens today, since under 
present law, if one steps into his or her car, he or she surrenders the 
“right to be let alone.” 
Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: 
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 169 
(2002)  
Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect than cognition. Privacy is 
a set of metaphorical boundaries that enables each of us to safeguard 
a sense of self. Privacy enables us to decide which aspects of ourselves 
to reveal and to whom. That control matters deeply, because overly 
selective exposure of ourselves to others will lead to their misjudging 
our nature.  
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 98 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core interests 
essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of 
movement.”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or 
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1775 
(1994) (claiming that government surveillance has reduced “the right to be left 
alone”). 
 109. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).  
 110. See id. at 948 (explaining that the government used the tracking device 
for twenty-eight days). 
 111. See id. (charging the defendant based on the information obtained from 
the tracking device). 
 112. See id. at 949–52 (explaining that the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test did not replace the Fourth Amendment trespassory test).  
 113. See id. at 954–64 (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to 
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it 
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement 
practices . . . .”). 
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at hand, given the contingent circumstances involved, but it is 
inadequate for resolving the broader twenty-first century privacy 
problems that occur when the use of powerful and ubiquitous 
surveillance technologies clash with the privacy interests people 
often claim to have while being in public.114 Simply put, while the 
Court ruled that Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, 
it did not clarify whether warrantless surveillance that yields the 
type of scrutiny Jones was subjected to—consider, for example, the 
possibility of the government monitoring smart phone GPS 
coordinates—should be deemed unreasonable, in principle, under 
the Fourth Amendment.115 
While Justices Alito and Sotomayor did not explicitly adopt 
obscurity terminology, their remarks clearly convey appreciation 
for the logic of obscurity theory. Indeed, they essentially frame 
lingering privacy concerns as obscurity issues, and in so doing hint 
at the radical possibility that the Fourth Amendment stands to 
lose much of its social value if its interpretation fails to better 
address the problems that obscurity theory renders salient. 
Justice Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”116 She further maintained that she “would not assume 
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the 
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”117 We see this as a clear appeal to 
consider additional constitutional protections for obscurity 
interests—to acknowledge that when citizens communicate with 
select audiences, it may still be reasonable for them to expect 
protections from forms of surveillance that bring heightened 
publicity to their disclosures. 
Justice Sotomayor suggests that such protections are 
especially relevant to consider in cases where the government 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 956 (“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”). 
 115. See id. at 955 (explaining that physical intrusion is no longer necessary 
for surveillance in many instances).  
 116. See id. at 956–57 (noting that the premise “is ill suited to the digital 
age”). 
 117. See id. at 957 (emphasizing that she believes telling a third party 
information for a limited use does not erase the person’s expectation of privacy).  
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easily can use efficient aggregation technology to transform 
otherwise discrete and comparatively obscure forms of information 
into integrated portraits that are conveniently available in a single 
location. Clear pictures of patterned behavior impinge on privacy 
interests because they can reveal intimate dispositions and 
preferences. Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor writes: 
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account 
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements. I 
would ask whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that 
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.118 
Justice Alito’s remarks about long-term surveillance 
undermining privacy protections echo two of the views that we 
highlighted in Part III of this Article: Harper’s historical sense of 
how privacy expectations developed alongside the practical limits 
that transaction costs impose and Surden’s view of structural 
rights.119 Regarding Harper’s concerns of practical limitations, 
Justice Alito contends that “[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest 
protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, 
but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of 
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”120 
Regarding Surden’s theory of structural protections, he claims that 
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.”121 
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito espouse ideas 
associated with what many have referred to as the “mosaic theory” 
of surveillance, which came to prominence in the case United 
States v. Maynard.122 Orin Kerr has summarized the theory as 
requiring “courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search doctrine 
to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id.  
 119. See supra Part III (providing background on the obscurity theory). 
 120. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2011). 
 121. See id. at 964 (highlighting the practical implications of the holding).  
 122. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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steps.”123 Kerr clarifies that “[i]nstead of asking if a particular act 
is a search, the mosaic theory asks whether a series of acts that 
are not searches in isolation amount to searches when conducted 
in a group.”124 A hypothetical application of mosaic theory, 
therefore, would be allowing government agents to engage in 
warrantless GPS tracking for a delimited period of time, but 
insisting that they obtain a warrant to continue on past this point. 
Kerr acknowledges that legitimate concerns for 
“equilibrium-adjustment” motivate mosaic theory.125 But he 
squarely recommends that the courts reject the mosaic theory, 
which he categorized as a “major departure” from traditional, 
sequential interpretations of what constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.126 According to Kerr, if the courts were to 
make the mistake of adopting mosaic theory, they would need to 
solve highly complex and overly burdensome puzzles, such as 
setting appropriate standards for determining when a mosaic is 
completed and determining which approaches to data aggregation 
fall under the mosaic purview.127 
Kerr is a leading critic of mosaic theory, but not everyone 
shares his pessimism about the costs of embracing it.128 After all, 
if technology can eviscerate obscurity, perhaps it also can be used 
as a tool to pinpoint when too much obscurity evisceration takes 
place. In this spirit, Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony 
Jebara, and Sebastian Zimmeck have contended that advances in 
the computer-science approach to machine learning make it 
possible in some domains to determine when an agreed upon 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 (2012) [hereinafter Mosaic Theory] (meaning that together 
the events can constitute a search even if the individual steps do not).  
 124. See id. (explaining the mechanics of the mosaic theory). 
 125. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479–82 (2012) (elaborating more fully on 
what equilibrium-adjustment is and why he believes it should be defended).   
 126. See Mosaic Theory, supra note 123, at 314–15 (highlighting how the 
mosaic theory is disjointed from traditional case law). 
 127. See id. at 314 (emphasizing the practical concerns associated with the 
mosaic theory). 
 128. See, e.g., Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony Jebara & Sebastian 
Zimmeck, When Enough is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and 
Machine Learning, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 556, 556–628 (2014) (supporting the 
mosaic theory).  
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threshold of overly invasive search has been breached.129 Under 
current algorithmic constraints, they argue that an approximate 
tipping point can be specified for going too far for warrantless geo-
location tracking.130 The demarcation, they speculate, is exceeding 
a week.131 
Jones is just one example of how obscurity is already 
embedded as a concept in surveillance law, yet courts have not 
adequately conceptualized it. This leads to splintered theories 
regarding theories of duration, information sensitivity, and 
trespass with no real locus for moving forward. By focusing on 
obscurity and transaction costs, courts would be able to isolate the 
operative factors concerning when an expectation of privacy is 
reasonable and a search is thus unreasonable.  
B. Obscurity and Surveillance Theory 
In addition to courts and policy-makers, surveillance theorists 
can also benefit from appeals to obscurity. To say that something 
is obscure is to describe it. As a descriptive concept, obscurity can 
be utilized by other theories of surveillance to explain when and 
why surveillance is problematic. In this way, obscurity can serve 
as a common thread for surveillance theorists. In this Part, we will 
demonstrate how the language of obscurity can supplement 
privacy theory by exploring, among other theories, the intersection 
between obscurity and the concept of “intellectual privacy” that 
Neil Richards developed.132  
Richards draws the line against government and corporate 
surveillance when agents, agencies, and corporations intrude too 
deeply upon “intellectual privacy”—the right for citizens in a free 
society to be granted a great deal of latitude to learn and express 
themselves without experiencing the behavior-altering chill that 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. (focusing on the importance of the use of technological advances 
on the benefits of the mosaic theory). 
 130. See id. (providing an example of how the technology could be utilized). 
 131. See id. at 625 (explaining the use of data sets in more detail). 
 132. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015) (discussing the complexities of corporate and 
government surveillance and the freedom of speech). 
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comes from suspecting intimate, belief-forming, and belief-sharing 
activities are being monitored, such as reading and debating.133 
A pressing challenge for intellectual privacy is the diminishing 
obscurity of public activity. Although public places are readily 
associated with heightened expectations of visibility, the fact 
remains that people engage with controversial ideas that expand 
their political and moral imaginations in public places all the time 
because they anticipate that what they say and do will only be 
observed by limited, local audiences.134 In other words, people 
routinely speak their minds publicly without presupposing that 
they are entering into full-blown public debate.135 They even view 
exchanges occurring in public as preparatory work for acquiring 
the psychological confidence and justificatory arguments needed to 
subsequently offer interesting remarks for more of the general 
public to consider. These behaviors and attitudes exist because 
free-flowing social interaction is a crucial component of developing 
and maintaining a mature and responsible consciousness. 
There is ample evidence that Richards’s view of intellectual 
privacy is widely maintained, even though the average person does 
not use such technical vocabulary to describe why it is possible to 
leave the house without becoming paranoid. For example, when 
people dine at restaurants, they are willing to engage in passionate 
arguments about contentious subjects rather than fearfully 
sticking to bland topics, like the weather. Folks are also 
comfortable marching in parades for social causes they are 
committed to, but do not necessarily want everyone who knows 
them to be aware of the cause they support. People are often even 
okay consuming media about unpopular and risqué topics while 
travelling on public transportation and sitting at cafes. But these 
attitudes can change. Surveillance technologies that dramatically 
minimize the transaction costs required for others to record and 
share information featuring or about us performing these and 
related activities can undermine our willingness to pursue them. 
According to Richards, such a blow to what we call obscurity would 
be potent enough to damage the fabric of democracy.136  
                                                                                                     
 133. See id. at 5 (emphasizing the problems of intellectual privacy).  
 134. Id. at 157. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 3 (“[W]e need to be clearer by what we mean by both ‘privacy’ 
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Another reason that the right to intellectual privacy is 
important in the digital age is that so much of what we disclose 
and peruse occurs over media connected to the Internet. Richards 
and others thus express concern over technologies that promote so-
called “frictionless” modes of social reading that minimize the 
control we can exert over what companies and other people know 
about our literary habits.137 “Under current law,” Richards writes, 
the electronic commerce company Amazon.com “is free to sell all of 
its sensitive data however it wants to.”138 This discretionary 
latitude is disconcerting because, by default, Amazon’s popular 
e-reader, the Kindle, “keeps detailed records of what we buy, 
browse, how long our mouse rests over a word and our eyes linger 
over a page, what pages we underline and what the most 
underlined pages are, whether we finish a book, whether we 
re-read a book, and what passages we re-read.”139 By emphasizing 
technologically induced, diminished transaction costs, Richards 
again effectively identifies decreased obscurity as the root of 
problematic surveillance.140  
Obscurity problems are also related to Richards’s worries that 
government surveillance is endangering intellectual privacy.141 
Consider, for example, his stance on the encryption debate that 
was going strong during the fall of 2014 and which persisted well 
                                                                                                     
and ‘speech.’ We need to think more deeply about the complexity of these two 
values, what they mean, what they do for us, and the surprising, mutually 
reinforcing relationships between them.”) 
 137. See Neil Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 690–
724 (2013) (warning about the information individuals give to corporations and 
their loss of control over the information); William McGeveran, The Law of 
Friction, U. CHI. L. REV. 15, 15 (2013) (noting that frictionless sharing discloses 
individual’s data immediately).   
 138. See Evan Selinger, What Is Intellectual Property, and How Yours Is Being 
Violated, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.csmonitor. 
com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0225/What-is-intellectual-privacy-
and-how-yours-is-being-violated (last visited June 18, 2015) (claiming that there 
are real political ramifications stemming from our intellectual data) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 139. See id. (focusing on the fact that librarians have ethical confidentiality 
obligations, but corporations like Kindle do not). 
 140. See id. (acknowledging that one avenue this problem shows up in is 
internet advertising). 
 141. See id. (explaining that intellectual privacy affects everyone—not just 
the scholars).  
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into the following year.142 Companies like Apple offered consumers 
products with strong encryption: the iOS 8 operating system, for 
example, provides encryption by default, and this means that the 
data stored on up-to-date iPhones cannot be accessed without 
breaking this encryption—an act that requires using the owner’s 
password or key.143 Security experts like Kevin Poulsen depicted 
manufacturing and distributing these products as gestures that 
distance Silicon Valley companies from being branded as “NSA 
collaborators.”144 But President Obama was so dismayed over the 
absence of backdoors that he decried designs that lock out 
government agents.145 
Richards is not persuaded by the logic of the President’s 
opposition.146 Appealing to intellectual privacy, Richards states, 
“Encryption provides necessary safeguards by securing what we’re 
thinking until we’re ready to enter public debate.”147 When pressed 
further about why due process does not assuage his worries about 
how the government will use backdoors, Richards justifies his 
position by stating that civil rights are protected when transaction 
costs prevent the government from conducting over-zealous 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Editorial Board, Compromise Needed on Smart Phone Encryption, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromise-
needed-on-smartphone-encryption/2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086 
a0_story.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (analyzing the link between technology, 
legal, and privacy concerns) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 143. See id. (explaining that the encryption is so strong Apple cannot even 
break it for law enforcement). 
 144. See Kevin Poulsen, Apple’s iPhone Encryption is a Godsend, Even if Cops 
Hate It, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 A.M.), http://www.wired.com/ 2014/10/golden-
key/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (explaining that several large corporations were 
painted as “NSA Collaborators” by Edward Snowden) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 145. See id. (“With the release of iOS 8, Apple made a privacy improvement 
so dramatic that it should rightly wipe out the taint of these security failures. 
Instead, the company is bashed by the nation’s top law enforcement official and 
the editorial board of one of the country’s most prestigious newspapers.”); see also 
Danny Yadron, Obama Sides with Cameron in Encryption Fight, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
16, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/16/obama-sides-with-
cameron-in-encryption-fight/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (discussing President 
Obama’s stance on spy access to encrypted cell phones) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee School of Law). 
 146. See Selinger, supra note 138 (explaining the strength of encryption 
compared to frictionless information sources).  
 147. Id. 
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searches.148 Although, yet again, he does not make an explicit 
appeal to obscurity, the proffered argument presupposes the 
causal logic that lies at the heart of obscurity theory:  
We know from Snowden and others that very often due process 
in national security cases is minimal to non-existent, and better 
checks need to be in place than the ones we currently have. Also, 
encryption doesn’t mean that government can’t ever get access 
to information, any more than putting locks on a door means 
that nobody can break into a house. The government’s response 
to this retort is that encryption makes it harder for law 
enforcement to do its job. But that’s exactly the point of civil 
liberties like intellectual privacy. They introduce 
inefficiencies.149 
When Richards emphasizes that the government can still 
access data that a citizen has stored on his or phone even without 
a back door, he is referring to the range of legal options available.150 
For example, if the government is looking for e-mail, it can 
approach a service provider and follow the routes permitted under 
the ECPA; depending on factors like date and whether an e-mail 
has been opened, the possibilities range from obtaining a warrant, 
obtaining a subpoena and sending out notification, or simply 
obtaining a court order. Or, if the desired information is stored in 
the cloud (for example, in places like Google Drive or Dropbox), the 
government typically can get its way with only a court order. And 
while consensus does not exist about whether a warrant is 
sufficient to compel an individual to decrypt a device, that outcome 
has arisen in cases like United States v. Fricosu151 and 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt.152 
This is not the first time Richards has called for limiting 
government surveillance by changing obscurity dynamics through 
the introduction of practical inefficiencies.153 In 2013, he argued:  
                                                                                                     
 148. See id. at 717 (explaining that confidential rules should guide disclosures 
of sensitive information). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. (noting also that backdoors make it easier for malicious hackers 
to access as well). 
 151. 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 152. See 468 Mass. 512 (2014) (dealing with a forgery that involved 
encryption).  
 153. See Neil Richards, Don’t Let U.S. Government Read Your E-mail, CNN 
(Aug. 18, 2013 9:04 AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/18/opinion/richards-
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We should presume the privacy of e-mail and other 
communications, and we should require the government to get 
warrants supported by probable cause before it can read our 
mail, track our movements and use our communications data to 
construct a map of everyone we know and when we talk to 
them.154 
In this context, Richards laments that Lavabit and Silent Circle, 
companies that provided encrypted and secure e-mail services, 
were essentially forced to shut down due to government 
pressure.155 Such disappointment can be described in obscurity 
terms, as Stefanie Pell’s work demonstrates.156 
When Pell discusses Silent Circle, she insists that the 
technology and others like it can play a special role in our post-
United States v. Jones society.157 The essence of her argument is 
that because it appears likely that time will need to pass before 
legislation is created that is in line with the concurring opinions of 
the Justices who are sympathetic to interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment in terms that reflect the mosaic theory, the power of 
code to function as what Lawrence Lessig calls a “regulator” should 
not be underestimated.158 Accordingly, she writes: 
While waiting for more definitive action from the courts and 
Congress, such “privacy enhancing” anonymization and 
encryption technologies can provide a temporary “fix” to the 
problem of ever-expanding police powers in the digital age, 
insofar as they make law enforcement investigations more 
difficult and expensive, thereby forcing law enforcement to 
prioritize some investigations and, perhaps, deemphasize or 
drop others.159 
                                                                                                     
lavabit-surveillance/ (last visited June 19, 2015) (emphasizing that 
communication is at the heart of our political freedoms) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. (explaining that the government was pressuring them to hand 
over Edward Snowden’s records).  
 156. See generally Stefanie Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a 
Technology Fix—Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 489 (2013). 
 157. See id. at 531 (explaining that Silent Circle is an encryption service 
offering encrypted texts and phone calls).  
 158. See id. at 489 (providing an overview of her article).  
 159. Id.  
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Obscurity can also aid theories that describe why dragnet 
surveillance involving large quantities of information is 
dangerous. Because most of our lives are lived in obscurity, the 
specter of surveillance occurring “most of the time” threatens to 
jeopardize this important default—a state of affairs that protects 
people from having to scrutinize every move they make. In the big 
data age, where digital dossiers containing massive amounts of 
personal data are expanding at an alarming rate, an appeal to 
obscurity can provide support for what David Gray and Danielle 
Citron call a right to “quantitative privacy.”160 
Gray and Citron begin their account of quantitative privacy by 
looking to the concurrences in United States v. Jones.161 They note 
that “[t]hose Justices insisted that citizens possess a Fourth 
Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information 
about them will remain private, even if they have no such 
expectations with respect to any of the discrete particulars of that 
information.”162 Under this theory, “even if the use of a GPS-
enabled tracking device to effect ‘relatively short-term monitoring 
of a person’s movements on public streets’ does not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, ‘the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.’”163  
The scholars note this is a revolutionary theory with an 
unclear fit in standard Fourth Amendment pedigree.164 According 
to Gray and Citron, “[a] quantitative approach to the Fourth 
Amendment appears to undercut well-established rules, including 
                                                                                                     
 160. See generally David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A 
Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy (2012) [hereinafter 
Quantitative Privacy], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id= 2129439; see also David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right 
to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71 (2013) [hereinafter Right to 
Quantitative Privacy] (discussing quantitative privacy and the mosaic theory’s 
dominance). 
 161. See Quantitative Privacy, supra note 160, at 12 (discussing Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion).  
 162. See id. at 68 (highlighting the difference between short term and long 
term surveillance).  
 163. Id.  
 164. See id. (claiming that it undercuts current doctrine, including third-party 
rules).  
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the public observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine.”165 
They note the theory’s challenges, stating  
Defenders of quantitative privacy must chart a conceptual link 
to these precedents or provide compelling reasons for changing 
course. Advocates also must provide a workable test that law 
enforcement and courts can employ in drawing the line between 
quantities of data that do and do not trigger the Fourth 
Amendment.166 
The scholars propose a theory to do just that, stating, “Rather 
than asking how much information is gathered in a particular case, 
we argue here that Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative 
privacy demand that we focus on how information is gathered.”167 
Gray and Citron argue that:  
[T]he threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether 
a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and 
indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable 
expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a 
surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is 
left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or 
other government agents.168  
Note that this theory is, at base, reliant upon the notion of 
transaction costs for surveillance. High transaction costs for 
surveillance eliminate the specter of a surveillance state because 
it would be resource intensive. Gray and Citron explicitly recognize 
this, stating that factors to consider when determining the capacity 
for broad, indiscriminate surveillance include “(1) the inherent 
scope of a technology’s surveillance capabilities, be they narrow or 
broad; (2) the technology’s scale and scalability; and (3) the costs 
                                                                                                     
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 71. 
 168. See id. at 71–72 
If it does not, then the Fourth Amendment imposes no limitations on 
law enforcement’s use of that technology, regardless of how much 
information officers gather against a particular target in a particular 
case. By contrast, if it does threaten reasonable expectations of 
quantitative privacy, then the government’s use of that technology 
amounts to a “search,” and must be subjected to the crucible of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, including judicially enforced constraints 
on law enforcement’s discretion. 
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associated with deploying and using the technology.”169 Looking at 
these factors,  
[i]f a court finds that a challenged technology is capable of broad 
and indiscriminate surveillance by its nature, or is sufficiently 
inexpensive and scalable so as to present no practical barrier 
against its broad and indiscriminate use, then granting law 
enforcement unfettered access to that technology would violate 
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.170 
One way to articulate when the right to quantitative privacy 
is threatened is when the obscurity is lost. When transaction costs 
fall, large amounts of previously obscure information are 
surveilled. Obscurity explains when and why quantitative privacy 
is triggered. Bulk quantities of information are important to 
protect, not because they are sensitive, but because people relied 
upon the obscurity of this, and indeed most, information. Gray and 
Citron even explicitly acknowledge the relationship between 
practical obscurity and quantitative privacy when they discuss the 
Reporter’s Committee opinion.171 
According to the scholars that developed the theories, 
quantitative privacy is distinct from intellectual privacy with 
respect to surveillance. In a response to Neil Richards’s article The 
Dangers of Surveillance,172 which articulated a theory of 
intellectual privacy for surveillance, Gray and Citron argue, 
“although Richards aptly captures the dangers to intellectual 
freedom posed by technologically enhanced surveillance, we fear 
his policy prescriptions are both too narrow and too broad because 
they focus on ‘intellectual activities’ as a necessary trigger and 
metric for judicial scrutiny of surveillance technologies.”173 
According to Citron and Gray, “by focusing too much on what 
information is gathered rather than how it is gathered, efforts to 
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 102 (highlighting the high transactions costs associated with 
surveillance).  
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 113–14 (mentioning that the costs of mass surveillance has 
been dramatically reduced). 
 172. Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 1934 
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protect reasonable expectations of privacy threatened by new and 
developing surveillance technologies will disserve the legitimate 
interests of both information aggregators and their subjects.”174  
They continue, “One reason we are troubled by Richards’s 
focus on ‘intellectual activities’ as the primary trigger for 
regulating surveillance technology is that it dooms us to contests 
over which kinds of conduct, experiences, and spaces implicate 
intellectual engagement and which do not.”175 Gray and Citron 
propose an alternative: “Rather than assigning primary 
importance to ‘intellectual activities’ and presumably providing 
less protection against the acknowledged perils of broader types of 
surveillance, the law’s focus should be on the dangers of totalizing 
surveillance.”176  
The concept of obscurity is thus useful for narrowing the gap 
between intellectual privacy and quantitative privacy theories. By 
recognizing that remedies focusing on transaction costs and 
preserving the obscurity of information can simultaneously foster 
intellectual privacy and quantitative privacy, it becomes easier to 
appreciate the common ground that Richards, Citron, and Gray 
share.177 Not only can policy recommendations build upon this 
commonality to create outcomes that both theories would validate 
as just (albeit for different reasons), but it also becomes possible to 
see how the type of machine-learning research championed by 
Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony Jebara, and Sebastian 
Zimmeck has the potential to advance outcomes prized by both 
theories too.178 Quantitative insights can illuminate when 
aggregation covers sufficient ground as to minimize the obscurity 
necessary for maintaining intellectual privacy and avoiding the 
threshold wherein indiscriminate surveillance occurs. 
                                                                                                     
 174. Id. at 267.  
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 176. See id. at 270 (“The threat posed by contemporary surveillance 
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 177. See generally Richards, supra note 132; Quantitative Privacy, supra note 
160. 
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V. Conclusion 
When government surveillance is understood as a series of 
discrete problems that just happen to be occurring at the same 
time, conceptual bias hinders surveillance reform: the right 
approach for finding solutions appears to be proposing discrete 
remedies. The patchwork approach to U.S. privacy law and judicial 
concern about undue activist overreach entrenches this 
propensity. The fragmentation of surveillance law further limits 
many proposed surveillance protections to conservative gestures 
based on doctrines whose applicability is increasingly challenged 
by powerful and cheaply available technology that disrupts social 
and institutional norms.  
Once it is clear that a common theoretical center of gravity 
underlies diverse surveillance problems and claims about why 
surveillance creep needs to be reined in, it becomes less 
challenging to imagine far-reaching and holistic approaches to 
progress. In this Article, we have argued that framing surveillance 
dilemmas as obscurity predicaments is a crucial step towards that 
goal.  
Applying obscurity theory’s two principle insights—the 
behavior-altering power of transaction costs and sociological 
explanation of why reasonable expectations for privacy can exist 
for public disclosures—is the key for identifying significant, 
common themes that have been communicated across forward-
looking surveillance literatures. The main conclusion that can be 
drawn under a unified obscurity-based approach to surveillance is 
that a democratically accountable government should find it 
appropriately difficult to violate the privacy rights of its citizens. 
Of course, determining what the threshold should be for 
calibrating appropriate difficulty is a contentious normative 
endeavor. No analyst can determine it solely by appealing to 
obscurity theory; after all, the framework is inherently descriptive. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the 
explanatory value of seeing undue expediency in obtaining or 
interpreting information as the fundamental problem plaguing 
government surveillance. Keeping this issue in mind when 
analyzing the specifics involved with any particular surveillance 
case makes it easier to appreciate why pervasive surveillance 
anxiety exists, how that anxiety can magnify the practical stakes 
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involved in a given instance, and why seemingly unrelated options 
for further justice (ranging from requiring warrants to proposing 
measures that make it harder to aggregate mosaics) actually 
converge around a common objective: adding friction into a process 
or system to make a person or piece of information harder to find 
or understand, thus preserving obscurity. 
